On Belief Reports in *Bangla*

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**ARTICLE INFO**  

**ABSTRACT**  
This paper studies various belief predicates in Bangla. In analyzing belief predicates in general, the Hintikkan universal quantification over doxastic worlds is executed in literature. But, this might not be true across the board. The variations in strength that Bangla belief predicates show cannot be taken care of only by the universal quantification over worlds. Following Hegarty (2011), we show that a generalized quantifier approach becomes rather useful in analyzing the Bangla belief predicates with respect to a scale of certainty. The paper also zooms in on two kinds of reading that Bangla belief predicates exhibit. These two kinds are - a bare reading and an eventive reading (see Hegarty 2011). We extend this discussion of these two reading types to address the famous parenthetical vs. non-parenthetical distinction (Simons 2007, Jary 2010) of belief predicates. Our paper shows that the former, i.e. the bare/event-less reading can correspond to the parenthetical type, while the latter, i.e. the eventive reading can associate itself to the non-parenthetical kind.

**Keywords:** Bangla belief predicates, generalized quantifier, event, parenthetical belief, non-parenthetical belief

1. Introduction

This paper deals with various sorts of belief reports in Bangla (*aka* Bengali). In this paper, we primarily address two issues concerning Bangla belief predicates. At the very beginning, we explore if the standard Hintikkan treatment of universal quantification over possible worlds can be applied across the board to all sorts of attitude verbs that express beliefs in Bangla (*à la* Hegarty 2011). More specifically, we put our view on Bangla belief predicates to check if all of them bear the same status with respect to expressing certainty toward their complement clauses. Intriguingly, we come up with an observation whereby Bangla has different belief reports that are more or less hierarchically arranged on a scale of strength. Let’s witness the following Bangla data.

(1) amar mon-e hOY je Rahul khun-Ta kOr-e ni.  
I.GEN mind-LOC happen.PRS.3 that Rahul murder-CLF do-3 PRF/PST/NEG  
kintu, ke jane abar kor-e-o thak-te par-e.  
but who knows PRT do-3-0 stay-INF can-PRS.3  
‘I suspect/it seems to me that Rahul didn’t commit the murder. But, who knows, he might also do that.

(2) ami biSSaS kor-i je Rahul khun-Ta kOr-e ni.

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I believe do-PRS.1 that Rahul murder-CLF do-3 PRF/PST/NEG
??kintu, ke jane abar kor-e-o thak-te par-e.
but, who knows PRT do-3-O stay-INF can-PRS.3
Lit. ‘I believe that Rahul didn’t commit the murder. ??But, who knows, he might also do that.

The above instances show a contrast between mone hO- ‘seem/suspect/doubt’ and biSSaS kOr- ‘believe’. In the former case, the speaker may utter mone hOWa even when expressing doubt at the same time. The but-extension to (1) shows that. By contrast, while uttering biSSaS kOra, the speaker is somehow certain about what she is going to claim. That is why the doubtful extension like the former cannot be compatible with (2). This suggests that these two predicates, though being belief reports, differ from each other with respect to the certainty level of the attitude holder. We explore other instances also in this paper to see the variety of strength that all Bangla belief reports exhibit.

As mentioned in Hegarty (2011), Katz (2000, 2003, 2008) analyzed doxastic verbs, like other statives, as simple belief ascriptions over worlds, i.e. worlds belonging to the set of doxastic alternatives of the attitude holder. Katz argued that the interpretation of a stative sentence can be taken care of without considering any Davidsonian event argument in that concerned structures. If the Katzian account is followed in analyzing belief reports, we will end up with analyzing them with no reference to eventualities (both events and states). But, this way of analysis is not totally feasible while considering non-parenthetical use (see Simons 2007, Jary 2010 a.m.o.) of belief sentences. This is the second issue that our paper is concerned about. Let’s consider the following Question under Discussion (henceforth, QUD) (see Roberts 1996).

(3) Background scenario: Rahul, Anu, Mina and Sam are friends. All of them except Rahul have invited Anu to their place. Under this circumstance, Sam asked Mina the following question.

QUD: Rahul Anu-ke Ekhono Dak-e ni kEno?
Rahul Anu-ACC yet call-3 PRF/PST/NEG why
‘Why hadn’t Rahul invite Anu yet?’
Mina: karon, Rahul-er mon-e hOY je Anu aS-b-e
because, Rahul-GEN mind-LOC happen.PRS.3 that Anu come-FUT-3 na.
NEG
‘Because, Rahul suspects that Anu won’t come.’

The above example of a question-answer sequence exhibits a non-optional use of mone hO- ‘suspect’ where the mental state of the attitude holder, i.e. Rahul here gets priority in the context in concern. Since Rahul suspects this way, he has not call Anu yet.
This non-parenthetical use of belief reports provides us the foothold to claim that event arguments can sometimes be necessary to account for this above-mentioned belief expressing verb in Bangla (cf. Hegarty 2011). The event-centric analysis for attitude verbs is pioneered in Hacquard (2006, 2010).

The next section deals with the empirical landscapes that show us that not every belief predicates in Bangla are not of same status in terms of their strength. It mainly consists of the requisite data which help us understand the variety of strength associated with the concerned belief reports. Section 3 offers an analysis that can account for this observation. Section 4 discusses the parenthetical and non-parenthetical division that Bangla belief predicates show, and we advance that the former corresponds to the eventless description of these predicates and the latter corresponds to the analysis of belief verbs considering event arguments in structures in concern. Lastly, Section 5 concludes.

2. Variation in Strength: Bangla Belief Predicates in Focus

As propounded in Hintikka (1969), all the attitude verbs involve universal quantification over words. Belief ascription over a clause holds in an evaluative world if and only if that clause holds true in all the doxastic alternatives of the attitude holder whose belief is under consideration. Doxastic alternatives of an individual $x$ in a world of evaluation $w$ denote the set of worlds where all what $x$ believes in $w$ hold true. Thus, a universal quantification over the doxastic worlds is proposed in Hintikka (1969). Following the standard Hintikkan semantics of attitude verbs, the first sentences of both (1) and (2) will be true in $w$ iff the following holds.

\[(4) \forall w' \in \text{Dox}_{sp,w} : [\text{[Rahul didn’t commit the murder]]}_{w'} = 1, \text{ where } sp \text{ stands for the speaker.}\]

But, there are various Bangla belief predicates that differ from each other in terms of the extent to which the attitude holder is certain about his/her belief. (1), (2) provide such a foothold for this claim. Thus, both $\text{biSsaS kOr}$- ‘believe’ and $\text{mone hO}$- ‘seem/suspect’ cannot be taken care of with the universal quantification only. The following subsection provides other empirical validations to claim the same in Bangla.

2.1 Detailed Empirical Footholds

Bangla has a number of predicates that are used to express beliefs in conversation. Along with the previous instances, we get other belief expressing predicates like $\text{niScit}$ ‘be sure’, $\text{bhab}$- ‘imagine’ etc. But, we advance that not all the predicates are equally strong with respect to the level of certainty. It is previously shown in Section 1 that $\text{biSsaS kOr}$- is stronger than $\text{mone hO}$-. Another test can be undertaken to claim the same where a weaker claim can be followed by a stronger one, but not vice versa. Let’s consider the following.
In (5) the belief statement is getting stronger from doubt to assertion, whereas (6) goes in opposite direction. That is why the second sentence in (6) seems weird to the native speakers of Bangla. The underlying intuition is – one cannot logically doubt what s/he asserted first, i.e. going stronger to weaker. But, it is quite feasible to assert what is doubted first, i.e. going weaker to stronger. This above test justifies that *mone hO* is weaker than *biSSaS kOr*-. The former one can be doubtful, while the latter one is more assertive.

We have noticed that (2) denotes such an instantiation, where the probabilistic extension does not become compatible with *biSSaS kOr*- ‘believe’. The same can be noted in case of *niScit* ‘be sure’ as well (7).

(7) ami niScit je Rahul khun-Ta kOr-e ni.
I am sure that Rahul murder-CLF do-3 PRF/PST/NEG
#kintu, ke jane abar kor-e-o thak-te par-e.
but, who knows PRT do-3- O stay-INF can-PRS.3
Lit. ‘I am sure that Rahul didn’t commit the murder. #But, who knows, he might also do that.’

But, do they belong to the same category in terms of strength in certainty? We object to it advancing that *niScit* is stronger than *biSSaS kOr*-. The following contrast shows this.

(8) ami biSSaS kor-i je Rahul khun-Ta kOr-e ni.
I believe do-PRS.3 that Rahul murder-CLF do-3 PRF/PST/NEG
Sotti bolte, ami eTai niye niScit.
In fact, I this about sure
‘I believe that Rahul didn’t commit the murder. In fact, I am sure about this.

(9) ami niScit je Rahul khun-Ta kOr-e ni.
I sure that Rahul murder-CLF do-3 PRF/PST/NEG
#Sotti bolte, ami eTai biSSaS kor-i.
In fact, I this belief do-PRS.1
‘I am sure that Rahul didn’t commit the murder. #In fact, I believe this.’

The above patterns in (9), (10) exhibit that one cannot go to belief from a certain, convincing position. But, one can go other way round easily. Thus, what we got so far is – biSSaSkOr- kind of stands in a mid-point of a certainty scale. Above that mid-point, niScit can be placed and below that placed is mone hO-. We are now left with bhab- ‘assume/imagine’. This concerned verb also refers to something which is weaker than biSSaSkOr-.

(10) Rahul majhe majhe bhab-ch-e je khun-Ta Anu
Rahul at times assume-PROG-PRS.3 that murder-CLF Anu
kor-ech-e, jodio Se Ekhono puropuri biSSaS kor-ch-e na.
do-PRF-PRS.3 though he yet totally belief do-PROG-PRS.3 NEG
‘Rahul at times assumes/imagines that Anu did the murder, though he does not yet believe it completely.

The above sentence exhibits a case, where the complement of the verb bhab- can be compatible with not believing it completely. Therefore, it can be seen as a weaker form than biSSaSkOr-.

What we got so far is a clear observation, where all the belief expressing predicates in Bangla tend to occupy different positions on a certainty scale. At the topmost position, we can place niScit ‘be sure’. The mid-point of the scale can be marked with biSSaSkOr- ‘believe’. And, below the mid-point, there can be placed mone hO- ‘seem/suspect/doubt’, bhab- ‘assume/imagine’ etc. that are weakest forms among them.

3. A Semantic Profile of Bangla Belief Predicates on a Scale of Certainty

As we have mentioned that all the above belief predicates are not equally strong, the formulation in (4) cannot be applied to them across the board. In other words, a uniform application of universal quantification cannot help us to account for the differences discussed above. But, will the existential quantification be useful to take care of weaker beliefs then? Following Hegarty (2011), if an existential quantification comes to the scenario, the quantificational force over doxastic alternatives would likely have the modal force of possibility. This type of modal force attests the statement *It is possible that Rahul didn’t commit the murder and it is possible that Rahul did commit the murder*. Therefore, if a quantificational force equivalent to possibility is assigned to mone hO-, bhab-, then one would expect the following as a semantically well-formed sentence, but which is not so.

(11) #amar mone hOY je Rahul khun-Ta kOr-e
Thus, existential quantification over doxastic alternatives will not help us anyway solve the problem of weaker belief forms. Hegarty (2011) gave a suggestion to treat the quantificational forces over belief worlds as generalized quantifiers to account for the weaker forms of belief reports. In line of this, we state that the strongest belief report \( ni\Scit \) involves the quantificational force of EVERY on an individual’s doxastic alternatives. Thus, the semantic condition as stated in (4) would be applied to the interpretation of \( ni\Scit \). It involves the universal quantification over an agent’s doxastic worlds. Let’s assume, basing on Hegarty (2011), that the quantificational force of \( bi\SSaS \) \( kO\cdot \), just like \( believe \), is an analogue to the generalized quantifier MOST. Therefore, the first belief sentence of (2) would be true in \( w \) iff the following condition holds.

\[
(12) \quad \text{MOST } w' \in \text{Dox}_{s,p,w} : \left[ [\text{Rahul didn’t commit the murder}]^{w'} = 1 \right]
\]

Now, we need to focus on the weakest forms \( mone \ hO\cdot \) ‘suspect/seem/doubt’ and \( bhab\cdot \) ‘assume/imagine’. Should we view them as the quantificational force of SOME? As SOME is analogous to the force of \( might \), and previously we explained why the treatment of possibility cannot solve the problem, we cannot state that the above-mentioned weakest forms of Bangla belief verbs can be taken care of by the force of SOME. Basing on Hegarty (2011), let’s assume that the quantificational force involved in \( mone \ hO\cdot , bhab\cdot \) is \( Q \).

\[
(13) \quad \left[ [\text{mone } hO-]^{w} = \lambda p_s \lambda e. Q \quad w' \in \text{Dox}_{x,s,w} : \left[ [p]^{w'} = 1 \right] \right]
\]

Now, the question is what the value of \( Q \) should be. Hegarty (2011) mentioned that a negated belief report \( I'm \ not \ sure \ that \ S \) gets true iff at least in some belief worlds of the speaker \( S \) is not true. Thus, in this case, the classical negation-quantifier interaction is used to employ negation where the generalized quantifier of its positive belief counterpart is converted to its dual. That means the EVERY force on the doxastic worlds of the agent in \( I \ am \ sure \ that \ S \) is converted to SOME in \( I'm \ not \ sure \ that \ S \), and \( \neg S \) is true in that existentially defined doxastic alternatives. Hegarty (2011) referred to this as Neg-Importation with Dualization (NID). Now, getting back to \( mone \ hO\cdot \), let’s see what its negated form looks like.

\[
(14) \quad \text{amar mone } hOY \quad \text{na} \quad \text{tumi amake EkSo Taka} \quad \text{I.GEN mind.LOC happen.PRS.3 NEG} \quad \text{that you I.ACC hundred rupees}
\]
dhar dite par-b-e.
lend give.INF can-FUT-2

‘It doesn’t seem to me that you can lend me hundred rupees.’

The above statement looks like a polite version of *I believe that you can’t lend me hundred rupees*. That means (14) will be true iff in most of the doxastic worlds of the speaker the addressee cannot lend her hundred bucks. Formally, the following must hold to get the same true in an evaluative w.

(15) $\text{MOST } w' \in \text{Dox}_{sp,w}: \left[\left[\text{you can’t lend me hundred rupees}\right]\right]^{w'} = 1$

If the statement in (14) gets the truth condition as stated in (15), then, using NID, we can say that the positive counterpart of (14) will be true iff:

(16) $\text{MOST}^\perp w' \in \text{Dox}_{sp,w}: \left[\left[\text{you can lend me hundred rupees}\right]\right]^{w'} = 1$

MOST$^\perp$ in the above formulation denotes the dual of MOST, and from (13) and (16), we can conclude that MOST$^\perp$ is equivalent to Q, and $Q^\perp = \text{MOST}$ (Hegarty, 2011).

Thus, we have got a generalized quantifier treatment over the set of doxastic alternatives to account for the variations in strength that the Bangla belief reports exhibit. The strongest belief predicate *niScit* ‘be sure’ involves the universal quantification. *biSSaS kOr*- ‘believe’, sitting at the mid-point of the certainty scale, has the quantificational force equivalent to MOST, while *mone hO*- ‘seem/suspect/doubt’, *bhab*- ‘assume/imagine’, being below the mid-point, involve the quantification which is the dual of MOST.

Summing this up:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bangla belief predicates</th>
<th>Quantificational force over Dox_{x,w}</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>niScit</em></td>
<td>EVERY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>biSSaS kOr</em></td>
<td>MOST</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>mone hO</em>, <em>bhab</em></td>
<td>MOST$^\perp$</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*Table 1*: Bangla belief predicates on a scale of strength

4. **Parenthetical and Non-parenthetical: Two Readings of Bangla Belief Reports**

Since Urmson (1952) until Simons (2007), belief verbs were uniformly viewed within parenthesis. The term ‘parenthetical’ refers to anything optional in structure. That means the one which does not contribute to the main content of the discourse is marked as a
parenthetical item in that structure in concern. Simons (2007) argued that the belief predicates can be used non-parenthetically as well (Simons 2007: (4)).

(17) A: Why didn’t Henry invite Louise to the party?  
B: He thinks that she’s left town.

The above question-answer discourse delineates a non-parenthetical use of think. Simons (2007) in this place advanced that the main clause has the main point status in B’s answer to what A has asked. In order to get a clear picture, let’s dive into how the main point of an utterance can be diagnosed. Let’s consider the following question-answer piece in Bangla.

(18) A: Anu klas-e aS-e ni kEno?  
   Anu class-LOC come-3 PRF/PST/NEG why  
   ‘Why haven’t Anu come to the class?’  
B: amar mone hOY je o OSustho.  
   I.GEN mind.LOC happen.PRS.3 that she ill  
   ‘I suspect that she is ill.’

In the above QUD (18), the embedded clause in B’s response constitutes the informative part of the answer to the query of A. We will say that mone hO- ‘suspect/seem/doubt’ in this particular QUD has a parenthetical status, i.e. it does not constitute the main point content of the discourse in concern. The parenthetical status of this belief predicate gets its foothold from at-issue semantics (Simons et al. 2010, Tonhauser 2012). This validation for at-issue content draws on Robert’s (1996) notion of QUD. In a question-response sequence, those contents, which can address the concerned QUD in a relevant way are claimed to get the at-issue status under some particular context. As per Tonhauser (2012), a natural language utterance can express more than one proposition, and which one among those will turn out to be an at-issue one depends on which can resolve a QUD successfully at a given circumstance. Simons et al. (2010) defined at-issueness in the following way.

(19) **Definition of at-issueness**  
(a) A proposition $p$ is at-issue iff the speaker intends to address the QUD via $\exists p$.
(b) An intention to address the QUD via $\exists p$ is felicitous only if:
   (i) $\exists p$ is relevant to QUD, and
   (ii) The speaker can reasonably expect the addressee to recognize this intention.

Conforming to this definition in (19), we attempt to explore what the at-issue content is in the QUD (18). The answer of B can denote the following set of propositions.
(20) \{p_1$: I think something, $p_2$: There is some individual called Anu, mutually known to both A and B, $p_3$: Anu is ill $}\}

All these three propositions cannot contribute to the main content in discourse. If we construct $p_1$, i.e. ‘Do you think something?’, it cannot address the question asked by A. So is the case with $p_2$ also. Both of them cannot resolve the concerned QUD. But, $p_3$, i.e. ‘Is Anu ill?’ can resolve that, since it partially entails the answer to A. And, it becomes felicitous because it is relevant to that QUD, and the speaker, i.e. B can reasonably expect A to recognize the intention of B. What turns out to be important that in (18) B’s thought does not get prioritized over Anu’s illness. Therefore, the main clause predicate does not make the main point of utterance (MPU) in (18). Rather, it is the embedded clause, i.e. ‘she is ill’ which constitutes the MPU in this QUD in concern. The belief predicate $mone hO$- gets the parenthetical status here, since its complement, but not it, is asserted here (cf. Hooper 1975). In contrary to this, (3) instantiates a case where Rahul’s thought is instrumental in not inviting Anu to his home. This is why $mone hO$- in (3), being asserted, is not a parenthetical one as what is in (18). The same can be extended to other belief predicates in Bangla to show that they can have both a parenthetical and a non-parenthetical status based on the context.

Hegarty (2011) espoused that a belief predicate can be associated with two kinds of reading, i.e. an event-less and an event-centric reading. The former reading is nothing but a bare belief ascription over the doxastic worlds of an experiencer, while, following Hacquard (2006, 2010), the latter involves the importance of event variables corresponding to the mental states. The evidence for the latter can be drawn from the use of anaphoric that, which refers to the eventive counterpart of beliefs (Hegarty 2011). Let’s witness the following instance (Hegarty 2011: (26a,b)).

(21) (a) Alex believes that Mary murdered Bill.
   (b) (i) That began/started last month.
   (ii) That has lasted long enough.
   (iii) The forensic pathologist’s report will put a stop to that.

In (21b) the anaphoric pronoun that denotes Alex’s mental state, which makes him believe that it’s Mary who committed the murder. The (i) sentence of (21b) demonstrates that the event of Alex’s believing such way started a month ago. The (ii) part says that this concerned event lasted quite enough; the event of Alex’s believing that Mary did the murder of Bill continued for a long time. And, the sentence in (iii) exemplifies that the forensic report will put an end to the event of his believing so. Thus, what is evident so far is, in all the three cases, Alex’s mental state is the at-issue content. Since Alex’s belief constitutes the main content of discussion, it becomes feasible to think that belief predicates sometimes can have the Davidsonian event arguments. The presence of the
event arguments can also be shown by adverbial modifications to belief predicates (Hegarty 2011: (24a,b,c)).

(22) (a) Max passionately believes that Mary murdered Bill.
(b) Max arrogantly believes that he is the greatest novelist alive.
(c) Max honestly believes that Maria is the best chess player in the world.

In analyzing the above set of sentences, one might think of viewing these adverbials as adjectival qualifications to the experiencer Max. But, one can easily argue that Max can believe something honestly, though not being honest himself at all. Thus, what is reasonable to assume is all these examples in (22a-c) bear some adverbial modifications that qualify the event of Max’s belief, not Max himself.

The same observation can be extended to Bangla as well where nominalized anaphoric references can be made to belief events along with adverbial modifications to the same. Let’s consider the following.

(23) (a) Rahul moneprane biSSaS kOr-e je Anu khunTa kor-ech-e.
Rahul passionately belief do-PRS.3 that Anu murder.CLF do-PRF-PRS.3
‘Rahul passionately believes that Anu did the murder.’

(b) tar ei biSSaS Onekdin-er.
he.GEN this belief longtime-GEN
‘This is his long-held belief.’

(23a) shows that an attitude subject’s belief can be intensified by adverbials. The intensification works on the event of believing, not on the attitude subject. And, this act of believing can be referred to by the deictic nominal ei biSSaS ‘this belief’. This nominal correlate lends us the foothold to assume an eventive interpretation of belief. Thus, the belief verb biSSaS kOr- ‘believe’ can either have a bare interpretation as in (12) or an eventive interpretation. Following Hegarty’s (2011) treatment, an eventive or a full interpretation of ‘biSSaS kOr-(x, p)’ can be said to be true in w iff the following holds.

(24) \[ \exists e \left[ \left[ \left[ \text{EXP}(x, e) \right] \right] \right]_{w} = 1 \land \left( \forall u: \left[ \left[ \text{EXP}(x, e) \right] \right]_{u} = 1 \right) \left( \text{MOST } v: v \in \text{Dox}_{x,u}: \left[ \left[ p \right] \right]_{v} = 1 \right) \]

That is, there is an event e that is experienced by x in the world of evaluation w, and most of the worlds, belonging to x’s doxastic alternatives relative to any possible world u in which he experiences that e, satisfy the proposition p. The trans-world condition is expressed by the universal quantification over u, where the experiencer refers to the same referent as what it does in w. Now, getting back to (23a), the adverbial modification,
namely moneprane ‘passionately’ adds another condition to it, i.e. ‘passionately(r, e)’. But, as Hegarty (2011) mentioned, this condition does not apply across the board to the e in all the possible worlds; the adverbial modification holds only in the world of evaluation, we assume. That is why this adverbial modification lies outside the trans-world scope, and the truth condition of (23a) looks like as in what follows.

\[(25) \exists e \left( [[\text{EXP}(r, e) \land \text{moneprane}(r, e)]^w = 1 \land (\forall u: [[\text{EXP}(r, e)]^w = 1) \text{MOST } v: v \in \text{Dox}_{r,u}): [[\text{Anu did the murder}]]^v = 1 \right)\]

The adverb moneprane associates the experiencer Rahul to his belief state in the world of evaluation. This belief state, in turn, is defined in terms of the cross-world content condition. The same eventive analysis can be extended to other Bangla belief predicates we are dealing with in this paper.

This full interpretation of belief predicates comes to the fore, while dealing with non-parenthetical beliefs as discussed earlier. Recall the example in (3). As evident from that particular QUD, Rahul has not invited Anu yet since it seems to Rahul that she won’t be coming. Thus, Rahul’s mental state gets priority here; it is his belief state due to which he hadn’t invited Anu to his place. This non-optional status of the belief predicate in (3) points to the involvement of an event argument. Hence, the belief predicate mone hO-‘seem/suspect’ in Mina’s response supports the Neo-Davidsonian turn, where statives can bear corresponding event arguments. Therefore, the non-parenthetical avatar of belief predicates can be taken care of by an event-centric analysis as made in (24). On the other hand, the parenthetical avatar of the same in (18B) can be addressed by a bare or a minimal interpretation as schematized in (16). Since the event of believing is not-at-issue in a parenthetical interpretation, a bare belief ascription should suffice to account for it.

5. Conclusion

To sum up, this paper focuses on Bangla belief predicates and challenges the uniform Hintikkan analysis for attitude verbs. Basing on Hegarty (2011), this paper proposes a scale for different belief predicates in Bangla. We show that Bangla belief predicates differ from each other with respect to the scale of certainty. In order to account for this variation in strength, a generalized quantifier account is executed for addressing the various quantification over possible worlds.

The next part of this paper deals with two kinds of reading that can be associated to belief predicates. These two kinds of reading are event-less or bare/minimal and eventive or full. We exhibit that these two reading types are useful in accounting for the famous distinction between parenthetical and non-parenthetical beliefs. The bare or event-less analysis accounts for the parenthetical, not-at-issue beliefs, whereas the at-issue or non-
parenthetical belief reports embrace a Neo-Davidsonian standpoint, introducing event arguments despite being statives. The importance of the attitude holder’s mental state as the main point of discourse leads us toward this kind of eventive analysis. On the other hand, parenthetical beliefs, being not-at-issue parts of discourse, do not require the involvement of event arguments; they are minimal belief ascription.

Bibliography


